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May 15, 1995

Members of the Legislative Budget
and Audit Committee:

In accordance with the provisions of Title 24 of the Alaska Statutes, the attached report is submitted for your review.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
DIVISION OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS

May 15, 1995

Audit Control Number

20-4511-95

The objectives of this audit were to determine whether: management controls have been established and implemented to ensure that supervision of probation/parole cases and preparation of presentence investigation reports are in accordance with laws, regulations, and departmental policies and procedures; departmental policies and procedures related to probation/parole activities are adequate, consistent with laws and regulations, and are complied with consistently; the staff reorganization of the Fairbanks Adult Probation Office during 1994 was in the best interest of the State; and alternative management approaches exist that would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the State probation offices.

The audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Field work procedures utilized in the course of developing the findings and discussion presented in this report are discussed in the Objectives, Scope, and Methodology section. Audit results can be found in the Report Conclusions and Findings and Recommendations sections.

Randy S. Welker, CPA
Legislative Auditor


TABLE OF CONTENTS

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION

REPORT CONCLUSIONS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

APPENDIX


OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

In accordance with Title 24 of the Alaska Statutes and a special request by the Legislative Budget and Audit Committee, we conducted an audit of the Division of Community Corrections (division) within the Department of Corrections.

Objectives

The objectives of the audit were:

  1. To determine whether management controls have been established and implemented to ensure that supervision of probation/parole cases and preparation of presentence investigation (PSI) reports are in accordance with laws, regulations, and departmental policies and procedures.
  2. To determine whether departmental policies and procedures related to probation/parole activities are adequate, consistent with laws and regulations, and are complied with consistently.
  3. To determine whether the staff reorganization of the Fairbanks Adult Probation Office during 1994 was in the best interest of the State.
  4. To determine whether alternative management approaches exist that would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the state probation offices.

Scope and Methodology

Our scope included the probation/parole function of the division. We did not audit the contract administration for community residential centers or the operations of the Point MacKenzie Rehabilitation Program.

We reviewed the current organizational chart for the division and the management controls for the Anchorage and Fairbanks Adult Probation Offices. We documented our understanding of the procedures for: assignment of PSIs and supervision cases, management review of PSI reports and compliance with the supervision standards, and the management and staff review of the data processed through the Offender Based State Correctional Information System. Alaska Statute Title 33 and Alaska Administrative Code Title 22 were reviewed for the laws and regulations affecting the probation/parole function.

Case management activities for the Anchorage and Fairbanks Probation Offices were reviewed for the period 1992 through 1994. We selected probation/parole case files for testing first by probation office and then by probation officer to ensure full coverage of the staff activities during our audit period. These files were reviewed for compliance with
supervision standards and the standards for PSI reports. Discussions with management and staff were held to determine potential operational and/or managerial issues that could be considered during the audit process.

The departmental policy and procedure manual was reviewed, along with any proposed changes by management. We reviewed internal departmental correspondence and prior audit reports concerning management issues. We discussed the issues surrounding the reassignment of certain staff of the Fairbanks Adult Probation Office during 1994 with staff and management. Results of our compliance test were considered in determining the reasonableness of the staff changes. Persons at the National Institute of Corrections and another state's probation/parole agency were contacted to discuss management issues and approaches.


ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION

Alaska Statutes 33.05 and 33.16 empower the commissioner of the Department of Corrections (DOC) to administer the probation and parole functions of the State. In 1991 those functions were organized under a separate division. The role of the Division of Community Corrections (division) is the supervision of adult probationers and parolees. In addition, the division is responsible for the supervision of felons and misdemeanants involved in the Point MacKenzie Rehabilitation Program and the contract administration for community residential centers. The division consists of five components: the director's office, the northern probation region, the southcentral probation region, the southeastern probation region, and the Point MacKenzie Rehabilitation Program.

The director's office is responsible for contract administration for community residential centers, administration and program design, budget and policy development, Interstate Compact administration, and support services for the three probation regions as well as the Point MacKenzie Rehabilitation Program. The three regional probation components are to provide for the orderly control and supervision of adult offenders that are either on probation or parole within their jurisdictions and to conduct presentence investigations for which reports are prepared and submitted to the courts. During April 1995, the probation/parole cases under the regional components' supervision totaled 3,701 which included 585 absconders (offenders who have fled from supervision).

The total appropriation for fiscal year 1995 to DOC was $128,183,250. Of that amount 14% or $18,273,890 was allocated to the division as shown below.

Division of Community Corrections

Component Units

Appropriation

Allocation

Director's Office:

Community Residential Centers
Other

$ 8,694,793
1,053,998

Probation Regions 6,810,899
Point MacKenzie Rehabilitation Program 1,714,200
Total Appropriation Allocation $18,273,890

The northern and the southcentral regional components are each managed by a probation
Fiscal Year 1995 Appropriation Allocations and
Positions for Probation Regions
 
 
 
Number of Positions
 
 
 
 
Probation
Officers

Counselors
Clerical/Aides
Northern Probation Region -
$2,276,578 appropriation allocation
 
 
 
Fairbanks
14
2
5
Barrow
1
0
1
Bethel
4
0
2
Kotzebue
1
0
1
Nome
1
0
2
Southcentral Probation Region -
$3,721,121 appropriation allocation
 
 
 
Anchorage
32
2
9
Dillingham
1
0
2
Kenai
4
0
2
Kodiak
2
0
1
Palmer
5
0
2
Southeastern Probation Region -
$813,200 appropriation allocation
 
 
 
Juneau
5
0
2
Ketchikan
3
0
1
Sitka
1
0
1

officer V, while the southeastern regional probation component is managed by a probation officer IV. The fiscal year 1995 allocation of the departmental appropriation to each probation region and the number of authorized positions were as shown at the right.

Two additional programs operate within the Anchorage Adult Probation Office, the Intensive Supervision and Surveillance Program (ISSP) and the New Start Program. ISSP was designed to function as an alternative to incarceration for prisoners, resulting in a reduction of prison overcrowding and corresponding cost savings to the State. It is both a punishment and rehabilitative service provided through an intensive community-based supervision program for a selected group of felons released early on discretionary parole from the State's correctional institutions.

The New Start Program is designed to assist ex-offenders in their integration into the community upon their release from incarceration. The program provides information to clients on available social services, including agencies that offer assistance with housing, employment, food, and clothing. During fiscal year 1992, the New Start Centers in Juneau and Fairbanks were closed due to underutilization. Services previously provided by those centers are now provided by the probation officers in those locations.


REPORT CONCLUSIONS

The Division of Community Corrections (DCC or division) does not enforce management controls to ensure that supervision of probation/parole cases is in accordance with AS 33.05 or departmental policies and procedures. Based on the results of our compliance testing, the supervision standards are not complied with consistently by staff or management. There is a long-standing, documented history of such noncompliance. Further, the policy and procedure manual has not been updated as recommended by several independent audit, investigative, and consultant reports dating as far back as 1989.

We found that management acted in the best interest of the State and the public safety by reorganizing the staff of the Fairbanks Adult Probation Office during 1994. Further, we recommend DCC implement a phone-in system for supervision of minimum risk probationers/parolees. We believe that such a system will result in no additional costs to the State. This should allow the probation officers (Pos) to allocate their resources to those offenders in need of closer supervision and to comply with the Department of Corrections (DOC) standards.

The following is a more detailed discussion of the above conclusions.

Supervision of probationer/parolees does not meet DOC standards

We tested a total of 72 case files (40 from the Anchorage office and 32 from the Fairbanks office) for compliance with policies and procedures related to the Pos' supervision of probationers/parolees. The following are the significant areas of noncompliance noted in our testing (see Recommendation No. 1 for further detail):

The existence of several of these compliance problems was also noted in a report issued on December 14, 1994, by a National Institute of Corrections (NIC) consultant that DOC had contracted with to perform a study of the division's computerized workload system. The main purpose of the study was to review the workload system formulas and to assist in a new time study of the various duties performed by the POs. However, the consultant concluded that before any time study can be performed there has to be policies and standards that are complied with consistently. Those standards must produce the outcome expressed by the division's mission statement. Further in an interview with the auditor, he explained that "if every PO is doing their own thing, with no framework, it is like having many individual probation/parole divisions within one office." There would be no point in measuring the time it takes to perform activities when there is little congruency with the activities actually performed by POs.

In addition to the need for consistent compliance with the policies and procedures to ensure effective and efficient operations, there is a potential legal liability to the State if procedures are not complied with by POs. For our 1991 audit on the Anchorage Adult Probation Office's ISSP, we reviewed the Alaska Supreme Court decision in Division of Corrections v. Warren Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1986). In that decision it states that if parole officers are negligent in implementing the departmental and the Board of Parole policies, and someone is harmed by a parolee, the State can be held liable. Parole officers must exercise "due care" in implementing those polices to mitigate liability to the State. We believe, in view of the results of this audit, DOC management would have difficulty proving that the "due care" criteria were met.

Therefore, we recommend the director of DCC require compliance with the policies and procedures of the division. (See Recommendation No. 1) Further, an integrated case management system should be implemented to assist the POs in planning the supervision activities for each offender. (Refer to the discussion below under the subheading "An integrated case management system necessary for POs' supervision of offenders.")

POs' ability to meet supervision standards hindered

According to DCC management and staff, a high number of cases is assigned to each PO and this impedes effective probation/parole supervision. We contacted the NIC to determine whether national standards for probation/parole caseload sizes have been developed and were informed that no such standards exist. While there are no national standards that we can use to determine the reasonableness of the Anchorage and Fairbanks offices' caseload sizes, there is evidence that we believe indicates that the size of individual POs' caseloads may be too high. The significant noncompliance with the departmental policies and procedures as noted above is one indication that management must make changes to ensure the public's safety through proper supervision of probationers/parolees. Another indication of high caseloads is the disproportionately, high caseload assignment to POs specializing in sex offenders.
December 1994 Caseload and Staffing Data for the

Anchorage and Fairbanks Adult Probation Offices

 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Caseload Size
 

No. of POs*
 
Average

Caseload per PO

 
 
ANC

FBX

ANC

FBX

ANC

FBX

General

Supervision Unit


1,041

427

12.5

5.7

83.3

74.9
Sex Offender

Caseload


204

85

2.0

1.0

102.0

85.0
Mental Health

Caseload


62

15

1.0

.3

62.0

15.0

Note: *The number of POs was calculated by beginning with the authorized positions and making adjustments for actual vacancies and leave usage.

One action taken by DCC management to handle the caseloads has been to separate the more labor intensive cases, i.e., sex offenders and mentally ill offenders, and assign them to individual POs who are willing to specialize in these types of supervision cases. We encourage the continuance of this procedure and recommend that DCC management consider expanding the use of PO specialists.

We reviewed staffing levels for the Anchorage and Fairbanks Adult Probation Offices for December 1994. Based on that analysis (refer to the table at right), we determined that the average caseload for the POs in the supervision unit, as well as for the sex offender and mentally ill offender caseloads, in the Anchorage office is higher than in the Fairbanks office. In both offices the sex offender caseload for each PO is higher than for the POs who handle the general offender caseload. This is of concern due to the fact that sex offenders as discussed above require a higher involvement of the PO in their supervision. Therefore, the sex offender caseload target should be less for each PO than the general offender caseload target.

The issue of sex offender caseload sizes was addressed in an October 30, 1991, consulting report prepared by William Pithers, Ph.D. that evaluated DOC's sex offender treatment programs. Dr. Pithers reported that:

In addition to segregating the sex offender and mental health caseloads and assigning additional POs to specialize in the sex offender cases, we recommend that the director of DCC implement the following changes to facilitate the supervision of offenders (see Recommendation No. 2):

We believe the phone-in method discussed below for supervising offenders assessed at the minimum risk classification will also assist in better management of caseloads. Together, these changes should provide the POs with additional time and opportunities to perform the supervision of offenders in accordance with departmental policies and procedures.

Phone-in system could reduce workload without increasing costs

We contacted the administrator of the Wyoming State Department of Corrections, Division of Field Services as recommended by the NIC consultant specializing in community corrections. The Wyoming state administrator explained that those offenders classified as minimum risk are required to utilize a contracted phone-in system. Sex offenders and assaultive offenders are not placed on the phone-in system as they are required to be under a supervision plan with a PO. Further, the offenders placed on the phone-in system have generally completed a portion of supervision that required contact with the PO. These offenders' behavior and performance of conditions of probation/parole have warranted a decrease in the supervision level.

A phone-in system replaces routine office visits with a PO. Thus, the use of the system makes more time available for the PO to manage those probationers/parolees who need closer supervision and also eliminates the need for the probationer/parolee to take leave from work for office visits. The phone calls are billed directly to the probationer/parolee through the offender's telephone service company. Therefore, the costs for the phone-in system are not a cost to the state agency.

We recommend the director of DCC consider the implementation of a similar phone-in system for the minimum risk probationers/parolees supervised by the division to assist in managing the probation/parole caseload. (See Recommendation No. 2)

An integrated case management system necessary for POs' supervision of offenders

The offender risk classification and case management system adopted by DOC in the early 1980's has been effectively dismantled. The requirement for case management plans was deleted and the completion of the risk/needs assessments for probationers/parolees by the POs has not been enforced.

Therefore, we recommend the director of DCC adopt and implement an integrated case management system, using a risk classification instrument and a case management planning document. (See Recommendation No. 3)

Management controls over operations not maintained

A high turnover of managerial positions at the departmental, division, and office levels has not provided for a stable control environment due to changing management philosophy and operating styles. In a three and a half year period (1992 through April 1995), the department and division management positions turned over between two and four times.

Of the four management positions at the Anchorage Adult Probation Office, one turned over four times, another one time, the remaining two positions were held by the same employees during the period. Of the three management positions at the Fairbanks Adult Probation Office, two of the positions turned over twice and the other position was held by the same employee throughout the period.

Management controls are necessary to ensure operations are in accordance with departmental policies and procedures, regulations, and laws. In an environment where turnover of management is frequent, it is even more imperative that control procedures are in place to ensure compliance with these requirements whether or not management positions are stable. The management controls needed include a departmental internal audit function, case review audits of probationer/parolee case files by the POs' supervisors, and computer data accuracy checks and retention of data reports. (See Recommendation No. 4)

Computerized information system needed for case management

DOC maintains the Offender Based State Correctional Information System (OBSCIS) which is an offender tracking system. OBSCIS is a menu-driven application, using 1960's data processing methods and design. This system was installed in the early 1980's and is too old to use with the newer technologies. DOC needs a computerized management information system with the capabilities to provide a case management function for DCC. (See Recommendation No. 5)

Outdated written policies and procedures

Despite recommendations since 1989 from DLA, Office of the Ombudsman, and a consulting firm, the policies and procedures affecting DCC have not been updated and revised. We believe this is a contributing factor to the overall low compliance with the supervision standards. (See Recommendation No. 6)

Sufficient funding not allocated for contractual drug testing services

DOC management has not allocated sufficient funds to secure a contract for urinalyses (UA) drug testing for the Fairbanks Adult Probation Office. According to the DOC contract administrator, DOC issued a request for proposals for UA collection and testing services. In response, there were several proposals submitted to DOC, but the proposals had to be rejected because they exceeded the funds made available for the contract.

POs from the Fairbanks Adult Probation Office have had to assume the responsibility of administering UA drug testing until a contract service provider is secured. We believe the Fairbanks POs simply do not have enough time to both supervise their caseloads and conduct UA drug testing. (See Recommendation No. 7)

Annual training hours not met and coordination on a department-wide basis not done

We reviewed training records for a sample of 23 POs that worked continuously in the Anchorage and/or Fairbanks Adult Probation Offices during the period 1992 through 1994. We found that between 65% and 91% of these POs did not receive the required minimum amount of training during the period. Further, based on our review of DOC training records and our discussions with DCC management, staff, and other DOC personnel, we have determined that department-wide coordination of training is very limited. (See Recommendation No.~8)

1994 staff changes in best interest of the State

During 1994 five long-term employees (two in management and three in the offender supervision unit) of the Fairbanks Adult Probation Office either were transferred within the probation office or DOC, resigned through mutual agreement, or were fired. Our audit scope included a review of the circumstances of such changes and to determine whether they were in the best interest of the State. We reviewed the underlying issues of contention and evidence regarding the job performance of the individual employees.

According to a review of certain intradepartmental written communications and previous independent investigative reports by the Office of the Ombudsman and interviews with staff and management, it appears that the underlying basis for the contention within the Fairbanks Adult Probation Office has been one of philosophical differences. This contention is documented through interoffice correspondence as far back as the 1970's with the transfer of certain individuals to the Fairbanks Adult Probation Office.

The manner and approach to performing the duties and responsibilities of a PO can be placed on a continuum. On one end is a school of thought that believes POs should perform their duties in a manner and approach more like law enforcement officers. These people believe POs should be armed. They emphasize surveillance and the arrest of probationers/parolees. At the other end is a school of thought that believes POs should perform their duties and responsibilities more akin to the approach of a social worker or counselor. These people do not believe POs should carry firearms. Their emphasis is on giving guidance and assistance to the probationer/parolee to enable them to successfully reintegrate into society.

Of course, there are those who believe a PO should carry out the duties and responsibilities of the position using an approach that melds the two extreme schools' of thought. The officer should assist and guide a probationer/parolee while at the same time ensuring compliance with the conditions of release. The offender is monitored for compliance by using a variety of enforcement measures, i.e., home visits, collateral contacts, urinalyses for abuse of drugs and alcohol, and arrests.

Two of the staff POs who believed strongly in the law enforcement approach participated in a large drug seizure operation in cooperation with the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency and the local police. During the period that the two POs were involved with the operation, it does not appear management ensured alternate coverage of the POs' caseloads. Whether or not the POs informed management of their activities, it appears neither the POs nor management were concerned with the potential problems that could arise from other cases not being properly supervised.

This conclusion is supported by the results of our compliance test of the Fairbanks office caseload. Those results show that these POs significantly contributed to the exceptions noted in our sample of case files. For instance, the audit step that determined whether supervision standards were complied with had a total of 19 exceptions out of the 30 case files tested. Five of the exceptions were on cases assigned to these POs while an additional five exceptions were on cases assigned to two other of the five employees (one in management and the other staff PO). It also should be noted that five of ten exceptions had gaps in the evidence of supervision ranging from five months to 12 months. These four POs were responsible for 53% of the exceptions noted in this area for the Fairbanks office.

Another audit step performed determined whether an initial risk/needs assessment had been properly completed within a reasonable time from the transfer of the probationer/parolee to supervision by the division. Of the 22 tested, we found seven exceptions. Five or 71% of those exceptions were on cases assigned to these four employees.

Another significant result from our compliance test and discussions with the Fairbanks staff is that the two POs who were part of management did not conduct case review audits as required. Of the 26 Fairbanks office's files tested for evidence of case audit reviews performed by management, 23 had no indication that the reviews had been conducted anytime during our audit period of three years. Current management performed the three case review audits. According to current staff, case review audits for the POs stationed in rural offices in the Northern region had not been conducted for several years, if ever, under the prior management. Case review audits of the Fairbanks office caseloads were very sporadic.

Based on the results of our compliance test on case files supervised by the POs affected by the reorganization and discussions with current staff, it appears they did not take seriously: (1) the need to supervise probationers/parolees in accordance with departmental policies and procedures, nor (2) the need to document their supervision activities to protect the State from liability if a probationer/parolee under supervision harmed members of the public.

Therefore, we conclude the separation or reassignment of the five long-term employees was in the best interest of the State and the public's safety.
Management has not acted on past recommendations to improve operations

Based on a review of twelve independent audit, investigative, or consultive reports issued since 1989, along with the results of our review of management controls and the compliance testing of this audit, we conclude that DOC management (past and present) has not adequately addressed the problems brought to its attention through these reports.

The commissioner of DOC and the director of DCC, along with a departmental internal auditor, should review the recommendations of prior audit, investigative, and consultant reports and implement those still pertinent to the improvement of DOC management and operations. (Refer to Recommendation No. 9)


FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation No. 1

The director of the Division of Community Corrections (DCC or division) should immediately require compliance with the departmental standards to mitigate the potential liability to the State.

As discussed in the Report Conclusions section of this report, we tested 72 case files for compliance with policies and procedures related to the probation officers' (POs') supervision of probationers/parolees. The files selected for testing were reviewed for the entire period that they were active during our three-year audit period of calendar years 1992 through 1994. The exceptions noted did not present a pattern in any one given year; they were distributed throughout the years under review. The following is a more detailed discussion of the significant areas of noncompliance noted in our testing.

While there are circumstances that hinder the POs' job performances (refer to Recommendation No. 2), there was also a significant problem noted concerning the organizational culture. This was recognized primarily in the Anchorage office but did appear to affect the Fairbanks staff albeit to a lessor degree. The cultural attitude is one of negation that seems to deny the validity of certain policies and procedures, offender risk assessment documents, computer data, and supervision procedures. Rather than focusing on positive ideas to perform their job in spite of fiscal constraints or banding together to effect change, the focus is on the obstacles whether real or imagined.

We believe this organizational, cultural attitude can be changed with strong, action-oriented leadership that involves the staff in the decision-making process. DOC and DCC management must update policies, procedures, and other offender supervision tools in a timely manner. The need for changes should not languish over the span of several administrations.

As previously mentioned in the Report Conclusions section of this report, the State may be liable for personal harm caused by the probationers/parolees under its supervision if POs cannot demonstrate that there was "due care" in implementing the policies and procedures. We recommend the director of DCC immediately require compliance with the departmental policies and procedures. In addition, the director should expedite the updating of those polices and procedures as recommended in this report and other audit and consultive reports.

Recommendation No. 2

The director of DCC should implement changes to facilitate supervision of offenders.

As discussed in the Report Conclusions section, we believe the following changes should provide the POs with additional time and opportunities to perform their offender supervision responsibilities in accordance with departmental policies and procedures. This in turn should assist in ensuring adequate public safety and assist in limiting the State's liability.

Under the present system, the POs are unable to manage their time to effectively supervise probationers/parolees in accordance with departmental policies and procedures. The results of our compliance test of case files from the Anchorage and Fairbanks Adult Probation Offices indicate that the policies and procedures are not being consistently applied.

According to management and staff, one of the reasons for this ineffectiveness is the size of the caseloads the POs are required to supervise. We contacted the administrator of the Wyoming State Department of Corrections, Division of Field Services as recommended by the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) consultant specializing in community corrections. The Wyoming state administrator explained that his division has gone to a two-tier method (minimum and enhanced) of risk/needs classification for offenders. Those offenders classified as minimum are required to utilize a contracted phone-in system.

The number of probationers/parolees classified as minimum risk offenders by DCC is sufficient to warrant consideration of the phone-in system. As of April 1995, the division had 367 probation/parole cases classified as minimum risk. This number may be higher given the fact that risk/needs reassessments are frequently either not completed or not completed within the required six-month intervals. The Wyoming DOC has a total of 225 minimum risk offenders reporting through the phone-in system.

DOC policy, section 902.03, requires probationers/parolees classified at the minimum supervision level to have a face-to-face contact with a PO once every four months and to submit written monthly progress reports for the other months. The phone-in system elicits essentially the same information as requested through the office visits and monthly progress reports.

The phone-in system utilized by the State of Wyoming is an exception-based, automated service that replaces the agency's labor-intensive manual system of caseload management with an offender-paid program. Offenders assigned to the program call a "900" number using a personal identification code and password. The offenders answer questions asked by a computer regarding: change of address, telephone number or employment, compliance with conditions of release, payment of restitution, and contact with law enforcement authorities.

If the offender reports any changes or provides information of other activities, the information is included in a report that is sent to the agency via facsimile. For missed phone calls, the offender is sent a reminder letter and the agency is notified of the missed call through management reports. Therefore, the PO must only allocate time to those offenders whose responses or missed phone-ins signal a need for closer supervision.

Through discussions with POs and the review of case files, we noted that frequently a probationer/parolee who has a scheduled office visit with his/her PO has prearranged time off from work to make the appointment only to find out once at the office that the PO cannot keep the appointment. Another office visit must be scheduled and the time off from work must once again be arranged with the offender's employer. The need for offenders to take leave from work would be eliminated with the phone-in system. Allowing those probationers/parolees who are striving to reintegrate themselves into society and to provide for themselves to do so without jeopardizing their employment.

We recommend the director of DCC implement a phone-in system for use by minimum classified probationers/parolees. We recognize that the effectiveness of the supervision of minimum offenders may be affected due to loss of visual and audio contact by the PO. However, we believe the ability for the PO to focus more of his/her time on the medium and maximum risk classified offenders outweighs this loss. We believe implementation of a phone-in system will assist in the management of the division's increasing caseload without additional costs to the State, both monetary and safety.

As discussed above in Recommendation No. 1, offenders assessed at the maximum risk classification must receive field contacts by the PO. The results of testing indicated a 71% noncompliance rate with this requirement.

One contributing factor to this noncompliance is the work schedules of POs. Currently, with the exception of the Anchorage Adult Probation Office's ISSP unit, POs in the Fairbanks and Anchorage offices work standard daytime shifts (between 7:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.). We believe it is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain effective field contacts with offenders by limiting contact to standard daytime hours. It is critical that POs have flexible work schedules to properly perform their duties.

We discussed this issue with DCC management, staff, and union representatives and found they were uncertain as to the ability to vary the working hours of a PO. We determined through discussions with DOC's human resource manager and review of the union contract that management can vary the POs' working hours upon proper notice to the employee or the employee may volunteer to work a different temporary work schedule.

DOC policies and procedures section 902.03 (D)(2) defines field contacts as:

Section 902.03 (G) requires POs to make field contacts with offenders that have been assessed at maximum supervision level at least once every four months. Field contacts are not required for medium and minimum supervision levels.

Many probationers/parolees are either employed or attending school. Therefore, they are not generally home during the regular day-shift hours worked by a PO. In order for the PO to observe the probationer/parolee in his/her own environment (home), the field contact must be performed in the evening hours. The general consensus of the POs interviewed was that offenders cannot be effectively supervised from the PO's office, and that field contacts, especially home visits, are an essential element of probation/parole supervision.

In order to ensure field contacts are conducted, probation office management should develop and implement work schedules that include some evening hours. Since field contacts are required only once every four months, this would probably mean that on an average a PO would have to vary his/her daily work schedule only a few times a month.

According to DCC management and staff, the high number of cases assigned to each PO impedes effective probation/parole supervision. As discussed in the Report Conclusions section of this report, we believe that the caseload sizes may be a significant cause of the noncompliance noted in Recommendation No. 1.

Contributing to the problem with the size of caseloads is the fact that DCC management has not developed an adequate system to ensure that caseloads are covered when an employee is absent due to illness, maternity leave, or vacation. We were told that probation office management provides some degree of position coverage but generally does not have sufficient time to take on the additional work required to provide appropriate case supervision. Further, several POs interviewed stated that it is unrealistic to expect POs to have to both manage their own caseloads and to take on additional cases for absent POs.

During compliance testing of probation/parole case files, we noted cases where the offender had reported to the probation office for a scheduled office visit, but the meeting did not take place because the supervising PO was absent. Review of case files indicates that in many instances the supervising PO took the appropriate action to reschedule the office visit. However, in other instances the offender was merely required to submit a monthly progress report to the probation office and was instructed to contact his or her PO to reschedule an office visit for the following month. The result of this is that the offender does not receive the required face-to-face contacts with his or her PO and the continuity of supervision is interrupted.

We believe that the Anchorage and Fairbanks Adult Probation Offices must develop procedures that ensure that caseloads are appropriately supervised in the event of a PO's absence. Additional roving PO positions could be used, in part, to serve this function by providing probation office management with the flexibility to assign staffing where needed.

The new roving PO positions would also provide the additional benefit of providing position coverage for remote field probation office absences. The northern probation region consists of the Fairbanks Adult Probation Office and remote field probation offices located in Barrow, Bethel, Nome, and Kotzebue. Similarly, the southcentral probation region includes the Anchorage Adult Probation Office and outlying offices in Kenai, Palmer, Kodiak, and Dillingham. The PO Vs in charge of the Fairbanks and Anchorage offices also are responsible for the supervision of the positions in the outlying offices in their region.

Use of roving PO positions would decrease the time demands on probation office management and would increase management's ability to perform vital management functions such as completing case review audits. (Refer to Recommendation No. 4) These case review audits would provide probation office management with vital information regarding the appropriateness of staffing levels.

Anchorage Adult Probation Office management stated that case review audits were suspended due to POs having difficulties maintaining high caseloads. The premise was that it would be unfair to evaluate POs that were overloaded by large caseloads. While we can sympathize with time constraints and other pressures put on POs and management, we believe that discontinuation of case review audits is counterproductive. The reason for this is that case review audits can provide probation office management with a gauge of the adequacy of staffing levels.

DCC management should establish roving PO positions for the Anchorage and Fairbanks Adult Probation Offices. We believe this will assist management and staff in ensuring that probationers/parolees are supervised in accordance with departmental policies and procedures. Additionally, it will increase the division's ability to limit the State's potential liability as discussed in the Report Conclusions section and Recommendation No.~1 of this report.

Recommendation No. 3

The director of DCC should implement an integrated case management system.

The division does not have an effective risk/needs classification and case management system as discussed in the Report Conclusions section of this report. The results of our compliance test of case files indicate that the policies and procedures (section 902.03) for risk/needs assessments and supervision standards are not being consistently applied.

In the early 1980's, the division, as a participant in the NIC's Model Classification Project, implemented the use of an offender risk/needs classification instrument, a case management planning document, and a workload time accounting system. The effectiveness of these in case management has deteriorated over the years since their implementation. First, the case management planning document was discontinued. The planning document was designed to provide additional insight from that obtained through the risk/needs assessment form for developing a case supervision plan.

The elimination of the case planning document left POs on their own to develop and document a plan that addresses the best way to deal with each offender. However, we did not note any such documentation in the case files reviewed. Generally, a DOC reviewer of a case file would have to read the chronological notes, the conditions of probation/parolee forms, and other pieces of paper to surmise the supervision plan.

As stated in the Report Conclusions section, the consultant from NIC we interviewed stated that, "if every POs is doing their own thing, with no framework, it is like having many individual probation/parole divisions within one office." There has to be policies and standards that are complied with on a consistent basis. The consultant recommended in his report that the division evaluate the suitability of the current risk/needs assessment instrument and consider alternatives such as: a dynamic risk factor-based instrument which might be more helpful in case planning, or developing an instrument and levels of supervision based on policy rather than an evaluation of risk. However, we believe the alternative which uses a risk-based instrument along with a case planning document lends itself to more effective management of resources.

The NIC consultant recommended we contact the administrator of the Wyoming State Department of Corrections, Division of Field Services. He believed that state agency had recently implemented some changes in its assessment and case planning procedures that may be useful for DCC.

The Wyoming state administrator explained that his division has gone to a two-tier method (minimum and enhanced) of risk/needs classification for offenders. Those offenders classified as minimum are required to utilize the contracted phone-in system. (Refer to Recommendation No. 2 above) For those offenders classified into the enhanced category, the officer must develop a case plan for the individual offender. Based on that plan, the number and types of contacts are determined, along with any programmatic needs (i.e., substance abuse treatment). The case plan is then reviewed by the officer every six months. Sex offenders and assaultive offenders are automatically placed in the enhanced category.

According to the Wyoming state administrator, this new system has moved the offender risk/needs assessment from a quantitative process to a qualitative process. It allows the officers more freedom to utilize their professional education, experience, and judgment in determining the extent of resources (including the officer's time) applied to an individual offender. In a climate of waning resources, it is essential that the staff have a system to assist them in determining where resources are best utilized.

We recommend the director of the division consider the implementation of the two-tier system of risk classification utilized by the Wyoming State Department of Corrections, along with the phone-in supervision system utilized for minimum risk probationers/parolees and the case management approach for those classified in the enhanced supervision category. If not the two-tier system, a comparable integrated case management system should be implemented to ensure better management of resources and increased public safety through more effective case management.

Recommendation No. 4

The commissioner of DOC and the director of DCC should implement management controls over departmental and divisional operations.

We recommend the following management controls to assist management in ensuring that probationers/parolees are supervised according to the departmental policies and procedures, regulations, and laws.

In September 1993 the Division of Audit and Management Services, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) within the Office of the Governor issued a report entitled Development of an Internal Audit Function for the Department of Corrections. According to an OMB audit manager, DOC has not implemented any of the report's recommendations.

The report had three recommendations regarding an internal audit function:

In view of the noncompliance with policies and procedures noted in our testing (see Recommendation No. 1 above), we agree with the OMB recommendations and believe the commissioner of DOC should take steps to ensure their implementation.

The departmental policies and procedures, at 603.03, provide for an internal check to determine whether the POs are in compliance with the supervision standards. During the planning phase of our audit, we interviewed the POs in Anchorage and Fairbanks who are in managerial positions to obtain an understanding of the management control environment and procedures.

According to the management interviewed in the Anchorage Adult Probation Office, during 1994 one supervising PO performed case review audits on five of the ten POs under her supervision, another stated he tried to perform some every 90 days but did not have an exact number, and the supervisor of the ISSP stated he did not conduct case review audits due to his own involvement in working the caseload.

The case review audits performed were only informational and not utilized in the evaluation of any of the POs. According to the PO V, this was done to provide the POs an opportunity to become familiar with the PO IIIs' expectations for supervision of offenders and the departmental policies and procedures. Management believed this was necessary for the training of newly hired POs and for existing staff as there had been a shortage of personnel during much of 1994, making the POs' jobs more difficult.

We were told that prior management in the Fairbanks Adult Probation Office did not perform case review audits of the caseloads maintained in the outlying offices within the northern region nor were they done on a regular basis in the Fairbanks office. During the latter part of 1994, current management performed case review audits at the four outlying offices and on the caseloads of three of the eight POs stationed at the Fairbanks office. However, these audits were only informational as with the Anchorage case review audits.

As discussed in Recommendation No. 1, we reviewed 60 case files that should have had periodic reviews performed by the POs' supervisors. The timespan reviewed for each of these cases was between two and three years of our audit period (calendar years 1992 through 1994). We could not find evidence of a case review audit performed by the POs' supervisors in 54 or 90% of the cases reviewed.

Case review audits are designed to provide PO supervisors with firsthand information on how well a subordinate PO is able to perform his or her duties. Results of these case review audits can be used for both determining areas where individual POs need further training and/or supervision and in determining the adequacy of staffing levels. Whether or not management chooses to include the results of case review audits as a factor in POs' evaluations, they should be performed consistently by management.

Clearly, discontinuation or sporadic use of case review audits is detrimental to effective case management. This has led to a diminished ability of management to monitor subordinate POs' compliance with supervision standards. Also, management's ability to determine appropriate staffing levels is hindered. The result is that public safety may be compromised and the State is unnecessarily exposed to potential liability as discussed in Recommendation No. 1.

Computer output controls are designed to ensure the accuracy of the processing result and to ensure that only authorized personnel receive the output. The output control procedures should include the procedures used by the data processing personnel for: determining the acceptability of the output before distribution, report distribution, user output review to determine the acceptability of the data, and the retention of the output reports.

We contacted the DOC data processing manager to determine if we could obtain a report of probation/parole cases that were active during calendar years 1992 through 1994. The only source of that information was individual monthly probation/parole caseload reports that listed the active cases as of the end of each month, first by probation office and then by the assigned PO. The data processing manager stated that in order to retrieve the historical information from the computer system an extensive computer program would have to be written and installed.

The probation/parole caseload reports are distributed monthly to each probation office. The data processing manager telephoned several probation offices to determine if they had retained copies of all the monthly reports for the three calendar years requested. It was determined that each office throws away the last monthly report when a new one is received. Realizing that no one was retaining the reports for use in developing historical statistics or trend analyses or for court purposes, she and the DLA auditor searched through a storage room for the reports. All monthly reports for the time period requested were found except the month of September 1994.

We selected and tested a sample of cases. Based on the results of our testing, we determined that the control procedure for user review of output to determine the accuracy of the data is weak. Of the 71 files reviewed to determine if the current data related to the case was accurate, 10% were not accurately reported.

When the auditors inquired about written output control procedures, the data processing manager stated that a few years ago she had volunteered to write some data information policies and procedures, but there was little enthusiasm for the project from upper management. Therefore, the project was never started.

We recommend the DOC data processing manager develop written computer output control procedures.

Recommendation No. 5

The commissioner of DOC and the director of DCC should implement a computerized management information system for the probation/parole function.

As stated in Recommendation No. 4 above, the only means by which DLA could select a sample of probation/parole cases supervised over the last three calendar years was to utilize hard copy computer reports. In order to access this information electronically through OBSCIS, the DOC data processing manager would need to write an extensive computer program. The ability for DOC management to retrieve historical information from OBSCIS for management analysis purposes is extremely limited. In fact, the administrative officer for DCC must use hard copy reports for statistical reporting purposes, rather than being able to generate a report from the data base.

In another DLA report entitled Department of Corrections, Board of Parole, February 28, 1994, we state:

In addition to the need for a complete, current roster of offenders on probation/parole, DCC management and POs need a system that will provide pertinent case management data, i.e., recordation of significant supervision activities and related dates, chronological notes, recidivism data, etc.

A number of other reports reiterate the need for DOC to computerize a data base for management planning, budgeting, operational efficiency, quality assurance, and program operation purposes. In addition, they recommend DOC provide additional data processing support to its personnel. Those reports also state that there has been inadequate computer equipment and staff training for computerized data collection.

While we acknowledge that DOC has acquired some used personal computers from various state agencies, there still remains a lack of adequate computer equipment and staff training to utilize such equipment. Further, without a complete case management system, these computers cannot be utilized for much more than mere word processors.

Lawmakers must be convinced that investing in correctional facilities and programs reduces the probability of recidivism and provides other societal benefits. The convincing cannot be done with promises; it can only be done with cost-effective programs and data that attest to savings from reduced recidivism and other identified factors.

As previously stated in another DLA report, there is a pervasive sense of frustration with DOC management by those seeking information from the department, including members of the state legislature. Quick, accurate, and complete information to which public officials have become accustomed, is only possible through computerized information systems.

We recommend DOC obtain and implement a management information system to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its operations. As stated in a 1994 consultant report:

Recommendation No. 6

DCC management should ensure that the division's policies and procedures are simplified, updated, and revised as necessary.

An audit report by DLA in 1989 on the adult probation/parole program stated there were differences in the way services were delivered due to: (1) the absence of polices and procedures; (2) inconsistent application of existing policies, procedures, and standards; and (3) use of procedures that conflict with existing policy.

In 1991 the Office of the Governor, OMB contracted with KPMG Peat Marwick to perform an organizational review of DOC. In their report, KPMG Peat Marwick stated departmental policies and procedures had not been revised or updated in over three years. This made areas of their review more difficult due to a lack of policy, or because adopted policy was out-of-date with current practices. In addition, the auditors stated:

Further, DLA recommended in a December 1991 report that the procedure manual be updated to include the standards related to ISSP. The only written documentation of the ISSP policies and procedures is in a brochure entitled State of Alaska Intensive Supervision Surveillance Program. The DOC policy and procedure manual has not yet been updated to include ISSP supervision standards and procedures. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman released an investigative report in March 1994 that included a recommendation that the policy concerning field contacts with probationers/parolees be clarified.

None of the above recommendations for revision to the policy and procedure manual have been implemented as of the date of this audit. However, DOC has begun to make an effort to revise the manual.

In July 1994, DOC contracted with the Alaska Judicial Council to review the departmental policy and procedure manual, statutes, and regulations governing DOC and the Cleary Final Settlement Agreement (Cleary). Based on these reviews, the council will make general, preliminary suggestions for reorganizing and reformatting the manual to improve its usefulness to the department's staff. The contract term is for 11 months. According to council staff, the policies and procedures related to community corrections have not yet been reviewed. These policies and procedures have little relation to Cleary and, therefore, are not a priority for the council's review.

In an attempt to further facilitate the manual revision, the DOC commissioner signed into effect in December 1994 a new policy regarding the policy and procedures manual. This policy established a policy coordinator who is to be responsible for monitoring the policy development process and to act as a technical writer. Currently, the compliance administrator has assumed the additional duties of the policy coordinator.

However, as policy coordinator, this person has actually had very little to do with the process to revise DCC's policies and procedures. Instead it was delegated to a committee of five community corrections staff members about two years ago. The committee was asked to review the policies and procedures and to make recommendations for revision. In December 1994, prior to the change in administration, the sentiments of the committee chair were that the committee members did not feel like they were getting anything accomplished and did not believe the management of the division was committed to the project.

In addition, the committee chair did not believe many of the POs were as familiar with the division's policies and procedures as they should be because they simply do not read them. During our audit, it was the consensus of those we spoke with that the policies and procedures are too voluminous and attempt to cover too many issues, which makes reading and understanding them an onerous task.

We contacted the administrator of field services with the Wyoming State Department of Corrections as suggested by a consultant with NIC. The administrator stated his division had within the last two years changed their risk/need classification system and revised their policy and procedure manual. A copy of this procedure manual was obtained by the auditors and provided to DCC management for its review.

DCC management should ensure that the division's policies and procedures are simplified, updated, and revised as necessary. This project should be completed as soon as possible, without any further delays or spans across changes in administration.

Recommendation No. 7

The director of DCC should ensure sufficient funds are allocated for contractual drug testing.

The Fairbanks Adult Probation Office's ability to effectively supervise offenders has been diminished due to DCC management's failure to secure a contractor to provide urinalyses (UA) drug testing of offenders.

UA drug testing serves a vital role in the successful supervision and rehabilitation of many offenders. Many of the written conditions of probation/parole issued by the court or the Board of Parole that we reviewed listed urinalyses as one of the procedures that the offender must willingly comply with during supervision. The frequency of such testing was stated to be at the discretion of the PO. In order for UA testing to be effective, tests must be administered frequently and on a random basis. The current situation does not lend itself to these criteria.

Drug testing for certain substances may require testing as frequently as twice a week. The most frequent number of office visits under the supervision standards is twice a month for offenders assessed at the maximum risk level. Obviously, to administer UA testing effectively a PO would have to schedule office visits with offenders far more frequently than required under the supervision standards. It should be noted that during our testing, we found a 71% noncompliance rate with the supervision standards, which included office visits. It appears that POs simply do not have enough time to both supervise their caseloads in accordance with the departmental standards and conduct UA drug testing.

Also, it is difficult for POs to conduct random drug tests because offenders typically know when their next office visit is going to take place. Furthermore, we were told that the paperwork involved in maintaining the legal chain of custody to preserve the integrity of UA samples to be used as evidence against an offender creates a substantial burden on POs. Maintaining the chain of custody is critical because UAs will be inadmissible as evidence for probation violations if the offender's attorney can show that the chain of custody has been broken.

Compare this situation with that of the Anchorage Adult Probation Office. POs from the Anchorage office frequently require offenders to undergo a series of random UA drug testing. These tests are administered by a contract service provider who is responsible for reporting the results to the PO and maintaining the chain of custody for samples. Valuable PO staff time is not consumed administering UA tests, and testing is able to be conducted randomly and with the frequency that is necessary to be effective.

We recommend that the director of DCC ensure that sufficient funding is allocated for contract services for UAs of offenders under supervision at the Fairbanks Adult Probation Office. This situation existed previously as noted in DLA's 1989 report on DOC's adult probation/parole program.

Recommendation No. 8

The commissioner of DOC should review the 40-hour training requirement for staff and ensure that all training is coordinated on a department-wide basis.

We reviewed training records for a sample of 23 POs that worked continuously in the Anchorage and/or Fairbanks Adult Probation Offices during the period 1992 through 1994. We found 65%, 83%, and 91% of these POs did not receive the required minimum amount of training during the years 1992, 1993, and 1994, respectively.

Section 401.03 VI (C)(2)(b) of DOC departmental policies states, in part:

DOC policies and procedures define professional specialists to include "probation/parole officers, case managers, counselors, social workers, correctional officers, teachers, medical personnel, etc." [emphasis added]

Ongoing training is one of the cornerstones of professional development and contributes to the POs' safety in performing their duties. Failure of DOC management to ensure that departmental personnel receive sufficient and meaningful training reduces the caliber of staff and reduces management's ability to accomplish its goals and objectives.

Several factors contribute to the high rate of noncompliance with DOC's minimum annual training requirements such as: budgetary cuts, scheduling difficulties (including inadequate position coverage for those attending training), and inadequate departmental coordination of training.

Based on our review of DOC training records and our discussions with DCC management, staff, and other DOC personnel, we have determined that department-wide coordination of training is very limited. We were told that one reason for the lack of coordination is that the individual institutions and probation offices tend to exclude each other's staff from attending training that the institution or office sponsor. We believe this and other related problems could be reduced or eliminated by requiring all training to be centrally approved by the DOC head training officer before being offered to DOC staff.

We compared records for training that was received by POs from the Anchorage Adult Probation Office and the Hiland Mountain/Meadow Creek Correctional Center (HMCC/MCCC) staff during the period January 1993 through September 1994. Given the close proximity of the Anchorage Adult Probation Office to HMCC/MCCC, it could reasonably be expected that training opportunities would be extended to staff from both of the facilities.

However, we found that this was not the case. Personnel from the Anchorage Adult Probation Office and HMCC/MCCC were provided separate specialized training in the areas of sex offender treatment, working with mental health offenders, and computers. In our opinion, this is a clear indication that current departmental policies and procedures fail to ensure that training opportunities are extended to all DOC employees. Training should be coordinated at the departmental level and should not be limited to a specific division, institution, or probation office.

DOC policies and procedures section 401.03 VI states that "[t]he Correctional Academy Supervisor [head training officer] will oversee the planning and coordination of all training programs." Sound management principles also dictate DOC departmental policies and procedures provide clear requirements regarding coordination of training on a department-wide basis. This is especially important given DOC's limited financial resources.

According to the head training officer, the DOC departmental policies and procedures related to department-wide coordination of training do not articulate his authority to enforce procedures related to coordination of department-wide training. This problem is further compounded because DOC's organizational culture has not placed heavy emphasis on compliance with departmental policies and procedures. DOC's head training officer stated, "[l]ook at the date of the policy. . . . [e]veryone ignores the policy." This is a pervasive problem within DOC. During the course of our audit, we were told several times that departmental policies and procedures are often ignored because they are either outdated, inapplicable, or simply because people do not want to take the time to read them.

Failure to coordinate training on a department-wide basis has resulted in DOC employees being excluded from beneficial training and in all likelihood has increased training costs. However, this is also a symptom of a larger problem. DOC management must have control over the department if management's goals are going to be achieved. Policies and procedures are designed to be formalized directives from management that establish a framework in which to achieve management's goals and objectives. Failure of personnel to follow, and management to enforce, policies and procedures is indicative of a breakdown in management control.

DOC management should revise the existing departmental policies and procedures related to training to reflect the current needs and resources of the department. We recommend that DOC refer to policies and procedures established by the State of Wyoming Department of Corrections, Division of Field Services for guidance in this area as that division provides 20 hours of annual training, 50 percent less than DOC is currently required to provide.

The following areas should be given serious consideration when writing the revised policy:

In addition, the authority and duties of the head training officer need to be clarified through establishment of standard procedures. All training should be approved in advance by the head training officer. This would provide centralized oversight of training on a department-wide basis and would bring additional cohesion to DOC. This is especially crucial in light of DOC's limited financial resources.
Recommendation No. 9

The commissioner of DOC and the director of DCC should review the recommendations of prior audit, investigative, and consultant reports and implement those recommendations still pertinent to the improvement of management and operations.

Based on a review of twelve independent audit, investigative or consultive reports issued since 1989, along with the results of the review of management controls and compliance testing of this audit, we conclude that DOC management (past and present) has not adequately addressed the problems brought to its attention through these reports.

This may be due to the absence of continuity in management, insufficient communications between the changing administrations of the department, refusal to recognize the issues raised in the reports as problems in the management and operation of the department, insufficient support by the governor and/or legislature to provide the necessary resources, or a combination thereof.

Problems in staff morale, as noted in DLA's 1989 report on DOC's adult probation/parole program and again in the most recent reorganization of the Fairbanks Adult Probation Office staff, may be diminished with the implementation of the recommendations of these reports. The inaction of management has promoted an organizational culture that allows employees to operate in noncompliance with departmental policies and procedures as noted in the five audit reports by DLA since 1989. In addition, the consultant report by NIC issued in December 1994 included statements indicating noncompliance by POs with the supervision standards.

The commissioner of DOC and the director of DCC, along with a departmental internal auditor, should review the recommendations of prior audit, investigative, and consultant reports and implement those still pertinent to the improvement of DOC management and operations.


APPENDIX

Offender risk assessments: An initial risk/need assessment must be completed at the start of supervision to classify offender supervision levels. Reassessments must be completed at least every 6 months thereafter.
 
 
 
Urban Supervision Minimum MediumMaximum
Face-to-Face Contact At least once every

4 months

At least monthlyAt least twice per month
Face-to-Face Field Visit Not required Not requiredAt least once every 4 months
Monthly Report During periods where there are no required face-to-face contacts See footnote 20See footnote 20
Rural Supervision Rural MinimumRural MediumRural Maximum
Collateral Contact At least once every

4 months

At least bi-monthly collateral and/or direct phone contactAt least once every months
Face-to-Face Contact Not Required Not RequiredAt least once every 6 months
Phone Contact Not Required See collateral contactAt least once per month
Monthly Report MonthlyMonthlyMonthly

ISSP Monthly Supervision Requirements
 
 
 
 
Supervision Level Phase I

(0-90 days)

Phase II

(91-180 days)

Phase III

(181-270 days)

Phase IV

(271-360 days)

Contacts:

Total Monthly
Face-to-Face
Telephone

20 per month
12 per month
8 per month

20 per month
8 per month
12 per month

15 per month
4 per month
11 per month

8 per month
2 per month
6 per month

Curfew Checks 4 per month 3 per month 2 per monthNot Required
Employment, Job Search, Vocational/Education Checks

Treatment Program Checks

4 per month

4 per month

3 per month

As appropriate

2 per month

As appropriate

1 per month

As appropriate

Drug/Alcohol

Testing:
a. No history
b. Occasional Use
c. Regular Use
d. Positive Test

Random
2 per month
4 per month
6 per month

Random
2 per month
4 per month
6 per month

Random
2 per month
4 per month
6 per month

Random
2 per month
4 per month
6 per month

Other Requirements
 
 
 
 
Community Work

Service Hours

16hrs per month

8hrs per month

4hrs per month

Not Required

Treatment ProgramAs required by parole agreement.
 
 
 



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